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5RESUMEN
El presente trabajo analiza la relacio´n causal entre la Ayuda Oficial para el Desarrollo y la
efectividad del Gobierno central en una muestra de 173 paı´ses durante el perı´odo comprendido
entre 1995 y 2015. Mediante una estimacio´n de Sistema de Me´todo Generalizado de Momentos
se encuentra que la ayuda extranjera para el desarrollo tiene un efecto negativo y significativo
sobre la efectividad del Gobierno central. Este resultado es consistente ante la inclusio´n de
diversas variables de control. Adema´s, el PIB per ca´pita, la participacio´n de las mujeres en
el poder legislativo, el control de la corrupcio´n y las restricciones polı´ticas tienen un efecto
positivo y significativo sobre la efectividad del Gobierno central.
Adicionalmente, se analiza la causalidad reversa entre la efectividad del Gobierno y la ayuda
oficial para el desarrollo. Mediante un Sistema de Me´todo Generalizado de Momentos se en-
cuentra que no existe un efecto significativo de la efectividad del Gobierno central sobre la
ayuda oficial para el desarrollo. Los resultados tambie´n revelan que el monto de ayuda ex-
tranjera para el desarrollo rezagado un periodo tiene un efecto positivo y significativo sobre el
monto contempora´neo.
Palabras clave: Asistencia oficial para el desarrollo, efectividad del Gobierno, Sistema GMM,
paneles dina´micos, correlacio´n serial, variables instrumentales, sesgo por omisio´n de variables
6ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the causal relationship between Official Development Assistance and Gov-
ernment effectiveness for a general sample of 173 countries during the period between 1995
and 2015. Using a System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation, I find that a
country’s net official development assistance inflows have a negative significant effect on the ef-
fectiveness of its central Government. This result remains after the inclusion of additional con-
trol variables. Furthermore, GDP per capita, participation of women in the legislative branch,
control of corruption, and political constraints have a positive significant effect on a country’s
Government effectiveness.
Additionally, this paper studies the reverse causality between Government effectiveness and
official development assistance. Using a System GMM estimation, I find that Government
effectiveness has no significant effect on official development assistance. Results also reveal
that one-period lagged official development assistance has a positive significant effect on current
foreign aid inflows.
Keywords: Official development assistance, Government effectiveness, System GMM, dynamic
panel, serial correlation, instrumental variables, omitted variable bias
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1 Introduction
Foreign funds have been widely used as one of the main tools to promote socioeconomic and po-
litical development in emergent economies. As “most underdeveloped countries depend heavily
on external resources to increase their per capita income”, “the inflow of external resources [. . . ]
has become virtually a separate factor of production” (Chenery & Strout, 1966, p. 679). For
this reason, there has been a growing debate regarding the effects of foreign funds in promoting
growth, stability, and development in recipient countries. This paper aims to determine whether
foreign aid has favored or hindered political development, through its impact on Government
effectiveness.
During the last decades, official development inflows have followed an upward trend, as
shown in Figure 1. Moreover, the members of the Development Assistance Committee of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) contribute with more than
US$140 billion per year in the form of development aid flows, and their official development
assistance averages 0.32% of their gross national income (OECD, 2016). However, despite the
increasing annual disbursements of aid from developed to less developed countries, economists
have failed to reach consensus regarding the effectiveness of foreign aid to promote economic
growth, increase political stability and improve social welfare in recipient countries.
In this sense, numerous research studies explore whether increasing amounts of foreign aid
have positive economic consequences in the beneficiary countries. Bru¨ckner (2011), Clemens
et al. (2011), Minoiu & Reddy (2010), Sachs (2005), Arndt et al. (2010, 2015), among other
authors, find that foreign aid does have a positive effect on short and long-run economic growth,
while others such as Easterly (2003), Rajan & Subramanian (2008), Murphy & Tresp (2006),
and Deaton (2015) find no real evidence supporting foreign aid’s effect on growth and ques-
tion its effectiveness to alleviate poverty. Given these contradictory results, researchers have
sought to determine the different characteristics and conditions that foster growth in developing
economies, and whether the effect of foreign aid is conditional on any of these characteristics.
Authors such as Easterly & Rebelo (1993), Fischer (1993), Sachs & Warner (1995), Chen &
Feng (1996), Acemoglu et al. (2001), and Aguiar & Amador (2011), find that economic growth
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Figure 1: World average net official development assistance, 1960-2015
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators
depends, to a large extent, on the country’s own institutions and policies. Certainly, “political
and legal institutions play a central role in setting the environment that can nurture prosperity
and economic growth” (Deaton, 2015, p. 388). Therefore, foreign aid might have a positive
effect on economic growth in developing countries, if there is an adequate set of policies and
institutions to allocate these flows of funds.
Empirical evidence suggests that foreign development aid has a positive effect only in
those countries “with good policies or governance” (Clemens et al., 2011, p. 1). Specifically,
results obtained by Burnside & Dollar (2000) show that “aid has a positive impact on growth
in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies, but has little effect in
the presence of poor policies”1(p. 847). Although research has found opposing results on the
role of institutions in determining aid effectiveness, there is reason to believe that the capability
of foreign aid to help a country achieve long-run economic growth, reduce population poverty
and increase social welfare may be determined by the effectiveness with which the central
Government allocates the resources received.
1These results have been questioned and refuted by authors like Easterly et al. (2004) and Jia & Williamson
(2016).
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Nonetheless, the aforementioned Government effectiveness might, in turn, be influenced
by the amounts of foreign aid that the Government gets hold of, as “[t]he Government needs
resources to carry out its functions” (Deaton, 2015, p. 390). Furthermore, good governance
(characterized, within other aspects, by effective Government) has become an objective as well
as a condition for development assistance (Santiso, 2001). As reported by Dollar & Svensson
(2000), development assistance has shifted its focus to promote policy reform, since poor coun-
tries were held behind due to poor policies rather than lack of financial resources. Additionally,
according to Deaton (2015), “[f]oreign aid, especially when there is a lot of it, affects how insti-
tutions function and how they change” (p. 388), as aid disbursements often respond to political
domestic and international interests of the donor countries, rather than to the real needs of the
world population in poverty. This claim is of particular interest, considering that almost half of
official development assistance is given to autocratic regimes, which use the funds to perpetuate
their leaders in power instead of effectively allocating them to development programs (Deaton,
2015).
In light of this debate, this paper looks at the relationship between foreign aid and Gov-
ernment effectiveness at a global scale, which provides a larger sample of countries that vary in
terms of size, context and development conditions. I use panel data on 173 countries for seven
three-year periods between 1995 and 2015, to construct a Systemm GMM estimator, which
captures the dynamic nature of a country’s Government effectiveness, while solving unobserved
heterogeneity and endogeneity problems. I examine the impact of an increase in net official de-
velopment assistance on Government effectiveness, measured by the index constructed for the
World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), and controlling for economic, social
and political factors.
Previous research has studied the effect of foreign aid on several political variables, such
as democratization (Knack, 2004; Wright, 2009), institutional stability, (Jones & Tarp, 2016;
Moss et al., 2006) and international cooperation (Kuziemko & Werker, 2006). It has even
linked foreign aid with concepts related to Government effectiveness, including corruption
(Tavares, 2003), economic policies (Murphy & Tresp, 2006), Government legitimacy (Diet-
rich & Winters, 2015) and governance (Kaufmann, 2009; Johnson et al., 2014). On the other
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hand, most of the research on Government effectiveness assesses “one Government agency’s
effectiveness, the effectiveness of several networked agencies, or the effectiveness of a state or
federal Government within a single country.” (Lee & Whitford, 2009, p. 2). However, very
few of them have evaluated the effectiveness of a whole country’s Government or compared
this effectiveness across countries. Moreover, most studies on this subject focus on finding its
determinants and studying how it responds to changes in different economic and political vari-
ables (Garcia-Sanchez et al., 2013; Moynihan & Pandey, 2005; Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999;
Montes & Paschoal, 2015). Nonetheless, to the best of my knowledge, there is no research that
explicitly studies the relationship between foreign aid and Government effectiveness.
Therefore, this paper’s main contribution is to present evidence on the effect of foreign aid
on Government effectiveness. Furthermore, this study aims to shed light on the reverse causal-
ity between these two variables, studying whether an effective Government is capable to attract
more or less development assistance. The present analysis uses an updated global database,
which incorporates more countries and a wider time frame into the discussion of Government
effectiveness, in comparison to studies conducted by Lee & Whitford (2009) or Garcia-Sanchez
et al. (2013). Finally, this paper improves the results obtained by Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013),
by incorporating level equations to the Generalized Method of Moments, thus estimating a “Sys-
tem GMM”, which provides more consistent and efficient estimates than a difference GMM.
The main results show that, after controlling for the lagged value of Government effective-
ness, foreign aid has a significant and negative effect on the level of Government effectiveness.
Specifically, a one percent increase in the amount of foreign aid received (measured in millions
of US$) decreases a country’s Government effectiveness in 0.000031 points. This should raise
concern regarding the aspects taken into consideration before disbursing development assis-
tance from developed to least developed countries, as larger amounts of aid may undermine the
Government’s capacity to allocate the funds and provide quality services to its citizens. More-
over, GDP per capita, the proportion of seats held by women in parliament, the level of control
of corruption, and the political constraints index have positive, significant effects on a country’s
Government effectiveness.
Regarding the impact of Government effectiveness on the current amount of net foreign
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aid inflows, the results show that there is a negative but insignificant relationship. This evidence
contradicts characteristics and objectives of aid conditionality programs. Moreover, the results
show that the lagged value of net foreign aid inflows has a positive significant effect on the
current receipts of foreign aid. This evidence raises concerns on the effectiveness of foreign aid
to promote short and long-run development in recipient countries.
2 Literature Review
2.1 Government effectiveness: definition and determinants
Government effectiveness is a key component of a country’s governance, but is often ambiguous
and complex to define. According to the World Bank, it refers to the “perceptions of the qual-
ity of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of
the Government’s commitment to such policies” (Kaufmann et al., 2010, p. 4). Similarly, Sacks
& Levi (2010) define an effective Government as “one that is capable of protecting the popula-
tion from violence while ensuring the honesty and competence of its bureaucracy and enabling
the provision and maintenance of infrastructure that makes possible the exchange of goods and
delivery of services” (p. 2325). Furthermore, Putnam (1993) establishes that any measurement
of Government performance should evaluate “its responsiveness to its constituents and its effi-
ciency in conducting the public business” (p. 63) focusing on three major aspects: policy pro-
cess (how well does the Government conduct its internal operations), policy pronouncements
(how well does the Government identify social needs and propose innovative solutions) and
policy implementation (how well does the Government use the available resources to address
the needs of the population).
According to Lee & Whitford (2009), studying Government effectiveness has gained im-
portance over the last quarter century, as it permits a finer understanding of the role of account-
ability in governance. Besides, a higher degree of Government effectiveness increases the level
of social welfare (Sacks & Levi, 2010), which is the ultimate goal of foreign aid. Kaufmann
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et al. (1999) find evidence of strong relationships between Government effectiveness and devel-
opment indicators such as child mortality, adult literacy and income per capita. Furthermore,
according to the Millenium Challenge Corporation (nd), “[c]ountries with more effective Gov-
ernments tend to achieve higher levels of economic growth by ... putting foreign aid resources
to better use”. Therefore, it is important to consider Government effectiveness in the analysis
of economic development. Many scholars have focused on explaining and modeling Govern-
ment effectiveness, and practitioners in public administration have even developed programs to
improve state Government management2. Nonetheless, “scholars have yet to develop clear and
conclusive ways of defining and assessing effectiveness” (Lee & Whitford, 2009, p. 2).
Several studies attempt to model the effects of different explanatory variables in the state’s
overall performance. For instance, O’Toole & Meier (1999) define a testable model for the im-
pact of public management over the performance of public organizations. Taking into consid-
eration the non-linear effect of public management and the impact of structural hierarchies and
social networks, they model program performance and find that public management, defined
as a “set of conscious efforts to concert actors and resources to carry out established collec-
tive purposes” (O’Toole & Meier, 1999, p. 510), affects program performance by providing
structure and stability for the system, softening environmental influences and exploiting oppor-
tunities. Sustaining these results through an empirical analysis at U.S. federal, state and local
level, Ingraham et al. (2003) find that effective financial, human resources, information tech-
nology and capital management are key for good Government performance. Authors such as
Heinrich (2002), confirm the importance of performance management in the public sector.
To deepen the previous analysis, O’Toole & Meier (2003) build on their prior model to
study how public organizational performance is affected by stability, defined as “constancy in
the design, functioning, and direction of an administrative system over time” (p. 45). They dis-
tinguish between the different dimensions of stability within public administration: structural
stability (preservation of organizational features), mission stability (consistency of objectives
of the administrative unit), technology stability (constancy in information technology that may
2A program example is the Pew Charitable Trust’s Government Performance Project, which ended in 2010
and evaluated how states administered funds, people, infrastructure and information. For more details visit http:
//www.pewtrusts.org/en/archived-projects/Government-performance-project
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otherwise generate productivity loss), procedural stability (low variation in set of rules, regula-
tions and operating procedures) and personnel stability (little rotation in employees who occupy
positions within the organizations). Through their model they find that a higher degree of sta-
bility (that could take the form of any of the dimensions described above) induces a higher
effect of current agency operations over future performance (O’Toole & Meier, 2003). Further-
more, the authors test the model empirically, using personnel stability in public education as an
explanatory variable and find that it has a positive, significant effect over public performance.
Moreover, Rainey & Steinbauer (1999) rely on literature regarding public performance, to
develop a theory on the elements that explain the effectiveness of public agencies. According to
the authors, the effectiveness of the Government is explained by “supportive behaviors from ex-
ternal stakeholders such as political authorities; agency autonomy in refining and implementing
its mission; high ’mission valence’ (an attractive mission); a strong, mission-oriented culture,
and certain leadership behaviors” (p. 1). These factors enhance various forms of motivation
within the agency, which increase its effectiveness. However, the applicability of these results
to a state-level has not been analyzed.
Subsequently, Brewer & Selden (2000) empirically test the previous results, along with
several alternative theories regarding Government effectiveness. Using data from the 1996
Merit Principles Survey, they confirm most of the relationships hypothesized in theory. Specif-
ically, they estimate the relationship between variables that measure perceived organizational
performance within agencies, and subjective aspects such as organizational culture, human cap-
ital and capacity, leadership and supervision, task motivation, public service motivation, and
individual performance, among others. The authors confirm that all of the dimensions exert
a positive, significant relationship over perceived organizational performance, except for the
excessive level of bureaucracy and formalities, which has a negative effect over the perceived
organizational performance within agencies. Likewise, Kim (2004) confirms the proposed the-
ories, but only regarding individual-level factors. These results, as all of the ones described
previously, are based on analysis for one or a few agencies within a single country, and its ap-
plicability may be limited for cross-country analyses, as “the quality of Government institutions
varies within countries, as well as between countries” (Sacks & Levi, 2010, p. 2326).
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Related to Government effectiveness, Boyne (2003) studies the sources of public service
improvement. According to Boyne, there are tangible elements regarding public service provi-
sion that may reflect improvement, such as quantity and quality of outputs, efficiency, equity,
value for money and consumer satisfaction. For any of these categories, Boyne recognizes five
theoretical sources of public service improvement: resources, regulations, markets, organiza-
tion and management. He identifies that “two of the five sets of variables emerge as the most
consistent influences on performance: resources and management” (Boyne, 2003, p. 390). This
finding is relevant for the present study, as foreign aid represents additional resources for the
Government, which are not always destined to development purposes. According to Boyne
(2003), this additional resources may allow the Government to acquire real resources, which in
turn, generate an improvement in public services.
Evidently, most of the previous research has focused on the analysis of Government agen-
cies performance within one single country. However, the increasing availability of data at a
country level has allowed cross country studies of Government effectiveness. For instance, Lee
& Whitford (2009) contribute to the discussion regarding Government effectiveness by using
the Worldwide Governance Indicators to analyze the perceived Government effectiveness for
a set of 212 countries and a time frame running from 1996 to 2006. The authors estimate a
simple multivariate model to study the variability in the level of Government effectiveness due
to different explanatory variables including region, legal origins, income level, land area, po-
litical and constitutional system, and electoral fraud. The main findings show that “much of
the variation in effectiveness is explained by the relative position of countries in the worldwide
income distribution, with wealthier countries experience greater perceptions of effectiveness
and those in the lower parts of the distribution being perceived as being less effective” (Lee &
Whitford, 2009). Considering that low income countries are the ones receiving greater amounts
of development assistance, income level is an important component inside the analysis of the
relationship between foreign aid and Government effectiveness.
Likewise, Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013) find the determinants of Government effectiveness,
measured by the World Bank’s WGI for a sample of 202 countries and for a period between 2002
and 2008. According to Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013), organizational environment, specifically
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higher economic and educational conditions, drives to important public sector reforms. For this
reason, the authors include Gross Domestic Product per capita and Adult Literacy as explana-
tory variables. Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013) also argue that organization characteristics have
a close link with the complexity of public bodies. Precisely, they recognize that larger coun-
tries, measured by population density, have larger budgets and more qualified human capital,
and that social diversity, measured by the proportion of seats held by women in national par-
liaments, provides a greater understanding of organizational demand. However, this assertion
is countered by Guisan (2009), who finds a negative relationship between population density
and quality of Government. Finally, Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013) affirm that “[p]oliticians are
the main actors in decision-making about the future evolution of the public administration” (p.
569), as they determine rules, incentives, financing and several other characteristics regarding
public activity. Consequently, they include the Political Constraint Index as an independent
variable.
Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013)’s study improves Lee & Whitford (2009)’s analysis by esti-
mating a Generalized Method of Moments panel data dependence model, which captures unob-
served heterogeneity and endogeneity complications between the dependent and independent
variables, which were not considered in the previous model that was not appropriate for panel
data modelling. Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013) use all the independent variables lagged from t1
to t3 as instruments for the equations in differences. Their main results show that organizational
environment, political characteristics and organizational characteristics determine the level of
Government effectiveness, but their impact depends on each country’s economic development.
Therefore, to improve Government effectiveness, low income countries should pay attention to
political constraints, middle income countries should focus on densely populated areas and high
income countries should increase gender diversity within the public sphere.
Similarly, with the objective of determining whether Government effectiveness is influ-
enced by higher levels of corruption, Montes & Paschoal (2015) study a sample of 130 countries
from 1995 to 2012. They conduct a cross country Ordinary Least Squares analysis, using the
WGI Government Effectiveness Index as the dependent variable and corruption indices such
as the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index and the World Bank Control of
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Corruption as independent variable, controlling for factors like public debt, trade openness, in-
flation, rule of law and democracy. The results suggest that “[c]ountries that are perceived as less
corrupt are also perceived as having more-efficient Governments” (Montes & Paschoal, 2015,
p. 147) and that the effect of corruption on Government effectiveness is higher in developed
countries. Moreover, the authors find that public debt and inflation have a negative significant
effect over Government effectiveness, while rule of law has a positive significant effect. Like-
wise, Brewer et al. (2007) find positive effects of accountability and control of corruption over
Government effectiveness for a sample of Asian countries.
In the same line, Adsera´ et al. (2003) estimate a pooled OLS model for panel data on 110
countries for a period between 1982 a 1998, to determine the relationship between quality of
Government, democracy and informational mechanisms. They retrieve data from the Interna-
tional Country Risk Guide, and regress bureaucratic quality on the level of democracy taken
from the Polity III database, and on the quality of informational controls measured by the daily
newspaper circulation. The model incorporates controls for economic development, religious
beliefs, ethnic fractionalization, type of legal codes, former communist countries, institutional
framework, asset specificity, size of Government, economic openness, proportion of senior citi-
zens, proportion of urban population, population and geographical area. Within the main results,
authors find that the lagged value for bureaucratic quality has a positive, significant relationship
with the current value of the dependent variable. Furthermore, results show that the degree
of citizen information has a positive and statistically significant effect over bureaucratic qual-
ity, as the presence of an informed electorate diminishes politicians’ opportunities to engage in
corruption activities (Adsera´ et al., 2003).
Conversely, Ahlerup & Hansson (2011) assess the effect of nationalism over Government
effectiveness for a cross-section of 79 countries in the year 2004. They conduct a two stage
OLS using the WGI Government Effectiveness Index as the dependent variable and the level of
national pride, taken from the World Values Survey, the level of ethnic fractionalization and the
trade openness as independent variables. The study’s main results reveal that nationalism has
an inverted U-shaped significant relationship with Government effectiveness, which means that
Government effectiveness increases with lower levels of nationalism until it reaches an optimal
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nationalism level. For levels of nationalism higher than the optimal, Government effectiveness
decreases. Furthermore, the authors find that ethnic fractionalization exerts a negative pres-
sure over Government effectiveness, while trade openness increases Government effectiveness.
Correspondingly, Whiteley (2009) finds evidence that political participation has a positive, sta-
tistically significant effect over Government effectiveness.
Seemingly, there is a close linkage between Government effectiveness and political vari-
ables such as corruption, political constraints, accountability, rule of law, degree of citizen
information, nationalism and political participation. There is also a strong relationship be-
tween Government effectiveness and socio-economic variables, including income level, public
debt, inflation, education level, population density, gender diversity and ethnic fractionaliza-
tion. Nonetheless, evidence suggests that Government effectiveness is also determined by the
amount of resources available to the Government. Therefore, I now shift the discussion to the
existing literature on foreign aid, and its possible political implications.
2.2 Defining and modeling foreign aid
Even though there are various sources of foreign capital inflows which increase domestic re-
sources, research suggests that disaggregating them into their principal components provides
better quantitative evidence on the relationship between foreign resource inflows and growth in
less developed countries (Papanek, 1973). Moreover, according to Papanek (1973), foreign aid
has a substantially greater effect than any other component of foreign inflows due to its abil-
ity to “fill the foreign exchange gap” (p. 122) and its specific design to encourage growth. In
general terms, foreign aid refers to money transferred voluntarily from one country to another
in the form of donation, subsidy or gift, for purposes of development, relief and rehabilitation,
stabilization or mutual defense (Randhawa, 2012).
When disaggregating the forms of foreign resource flows to developing nations, the ma-
jor component is Official Development Assistance (ODA)3 (Deaton, 2015). According to the
OECD’s Development Assistance Committee, ODA is the “Government aid designed to pro-
mote the economic development and welfare of developing countries”; namely, around 150
3From this point, the term ’foreign aid’ refers to Official Development Assistance.
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countries around the world which have a per capita income lower than 12,276 US$ of 2010.
This aid may be delivered directly from donor to recipient, or may be channeled through inter-
national organizations and development agencies. As reported by the OECD (2018), the flows
of ODA from DAC countries to developing nations in 2016 totaled 61.9 billions of US$. Of this
total, around 44% was destined to African nations, while 39% was allocated to Asian countries.
The United Nations has targeted that developed countries should donate 0.7% of their
Gross National Income as ODA. Currently, the United States, Germany and Britain are the
most important net ODA providers. However, in relative terms, Scandinavian countries devote
a larger percent of their gross national income to ODA transfers. This reflects a higher degree
of donor commitment in the latter countries, in comparison with the former, in which the per-
centage of national income devoted to ODA is very low and reaches, for example, only around
0.2% for the United States (Deaton, 2015).
Given that development aid is designed to help mitigate global poverty, it should theoret-
ically be disbursed according to the needs of the world population living in such conditions.
Most of international agencies created and devoted to promote poverty reduction and economic
development, disburse aid conditional on certain factors, such as adequate levels of governance
and promotion of economic freedom (Johnson et al., 2014). Furthermore, they often impose
conditions as to what objectives should be accomplished through aid receipts, including im-
provements in development indicators. However, most of foreign aid (approximately 80%,
according to Deaton (2015)) is delivered bilaterally from one country to another, or specifically
from one Government to another, “guided less by the needs of the recipients than by the donor
country’s domestic and international interests” (Deaton, 2015, p. 363), which usually differ
from those of the population in the recipient country.
For instance, Alesina & Dollar (2000) study the pattern of foreign aid distribution from
different donors to numerous recipient countries. Using the Official Development Assistance
data as dependent variable, they estimate a log-level equation to study the effect of trade open-
ness, democracy, civil liberties, colonial status, direct foreign investment, initial income and
population on the amount of foreign aid received by different countries. They analyze the pos-
sibility that all the independent variables are exogenous, and further consider the presence of
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endogeneity, as democracy and trade openness may be influenced by foreign aid. Main results
from this study show that “factors such as colonial past and voting patterns at the United Na-
tions explain more of the distribution of aid than the political institutions or the economic policy
of recipients” (Alesina & Dollar, 2000, p. 55). Specifically, they find that from the three most
important foreign aid providers, the United States devotes most of its aid to Egypt and Israel,
France destines most funds to its former colonies and Japan donates the most according to the
United Nations voting patterns.
Likewise, Kuziemko & Werker (2006) find strong evidence on the pattern between foreign
aid disbursements to rotating members of the United Nations’ Security Council and vote buying.
The authors estimate a model within countries with time and country fixed effects, regressing
foreign aid receipts on a dummy variable indicating whether the country served as member of
the Security Council during a specific year, and controlling for political and economic vari-
ables including wars happening in recipient countries, dictatorship/democracy scores and real
gross domestic product. Kuziemko & Werker (2006)’s main results show that Security Council
membership increases foreign aid receipts from the United States in 59 percentage points, and
foreign aid receipts from the United Nations in 8 percentage points. Furthermore, the authors
find that foreign aid to Security Council members increases in the year in which a country is
elected to the Security Council, remains high during the two years of membership, is higher
during important diplomatic years, and sharply decreases as soon as its membership term is
over.
As evidence suggests, aid disbursements often respond to political interests from the donor
countries rather than to actual considerations of the necessities of the developing recipient coun-
tries. Furthermore, donor countries give more importance to the volume of aid disbursed, and
frequently disregard the effects of the funds over recipient populations, (Deaton, 2015). Among
other reasons, this may explain why aid has not always been effective in achieving poverty
reduction goals or promoting better governance. Related to this statement, Bearce & Tirone
(2010) find that foreign aid favors economic growth in recipient countries “by facilitating eco-
nomic reform, but only when the strategic benefits associated with providing aid are small for
donor Governments” (p. 837). When this is not the case, donor Governments fail to credibly
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enforce their conditions for economic reform, and thus, aid becomes ineffective.
Considerable debate has emerged regarding the previous claims. Nonetheless, economists
have not agreed on whether foreign aid fosters economic growth and development. Angus
Deaton (2015), in his book The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality,
argues that foreign aid has been ineffective in reducing poverty. Aside from following political
interests, according to Deaton (2015), aid’s fungibility often causes development assistance to
end up being used for other purposes, or even in the hands of corrupt politicians. Furthermore,
Deaton (2015) also attributes ODA’s ineffectiveness to “aid fragmentation” by donor countries,
as small countries receive a greater amount of aid, but the world’s poorest people live in bigger
countries. Deaton (2015) also compares foreign aid to commodity price booms, in the sense that
“cash flows come and go in a way that is divorced from domestic needs or domestic politics”
(p. 393). According to the author, this may weaken a state’s fiscal capacity while stimulating
Government expenditure, which is unsustainable in the long-run. This last statement debunks
Barro (1990)’s findings, which show, through an endogenous growth model, that foreign aid
promotes growth and investment by allowing the reduction of distortionary taxes.
Bauer (1969) establishes that foreign aid is not a necessary nor a sufficient condition for
economic advance, as it is ineffective in promoting development if the population is not inter-
ested in material success due to customs and values that are incongruous with material progress.
Furthermore, he argues that aid flows have more often retarded economic advance rather than
promoted it, because it debilitate the process of generating local resources and because its re-
sults depend on “the repercussions of aid on economic capacities, policies and institutions, and
on the allocation of the resources in the recipient countries”, which are often damaging. For-
eign aid, he argues, is incapable of affecting the basic determinants of development and there-
fore, if a country “cannot develop without foreign aid it is unlikely to develop with it” (Bauer,
1969). Moreover, according to Bauer (1969), receipts of foreign aid promote the concentration
of power, as they augment the resources available to the Government in comparison with those
of the private sector.
On the other hand, Sachs (2005) argues that it is a responsibility of developed countries
to promote development within least developed nations, and defends the effectiveness of for-
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eign aid in helping least developed countries out the ’poverty trap’. Specifically, he claims that
a substantial amount of development assistance sustained over a long period of time, helps to
boot a process of capital accumulation, which increases household earnings above subsistence
levels and promotes economic growth. However, Sachs (2005) recognizes that aid effectiveness
is conditional on specific characteristics. Namely, for aid to have positive effects on poverty re-
duction, the state should implement an effective administrative strategy with an adequate level
of decentralization, develop a training program to build and strengthen the Government’s ca-
pacity to allocate resources, implement a wider use of information technology within the public
sector, establish a quantitative baseline regarding the objectives that it aims to achieve with the
foreign aid, and constantly monitor and evaluate the assignment and use of those resources.
Beyond theoretical discussion, empirical studies also reveal contradictory evidence re-
garding the impact of foreign aid on economic growth. Several authors have empirically tested
the effect of foreign assistance over economic performance, and found no evidence suggest-
ing aid’s effectiveness. For example, Boone (1996) analyzes the effectiveness of foreign aid,
depending on each country’s political regime. Theoretically, the author establishes that for-
eign assistance does not promote economic development because poverty is not generated by
a lack of capital and because it reduces the politician’s efficiency when adjusting distortionary
policies. Using a sample of 96 countries with five-year and decade averaged data, he tests
the hypothesis that “politicians will use aid for transfers and not to reduce internal distortions”
(Boone, 1996). Specifically, the author measures if foreign aid allows Governments to reduce
distortionary policies, if these reductions have an indirect impact over consumption and invest-
ment, if Governments actually use foreign aid receipts to favor the poor, and if certain political
regimes are more efficient than others when allocating foreign aid resources.
Boone (1996) finds that political factors are important determinants of aid flows. There-
fore, he uses these political factors as well as country size to instrument foreign aid. He com-
pares the instrumental variables models with regular OLS, and finds that the impact of foreign
aid over investment and measures of human development like infant mortality and primary
schooling ratios is insignificant. Furthermore, he finds that “all political systems allocate aid to
the elite” (p. 34) and therefore, foreign aid has a significant impact over the size of the bureau-
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cratic state. Finally, Boone (1996) concludes that short-term flows of aid addressed to support
new liberal regimes may be more successful to reduce poverty.
Likewise, Veiderpass & Andersson (2007) study the effectiveness of foreign aid in a pro-
duction theory context for a sample of 60 countries between 1995 and 2000. To do this, the
authors measure how well countries use their resources through an efficiency index that follows
the Data Envelopment Analysis method. They estimate a multiple input - single output pro-
duction model, using energy use, labour force and capital stock as explanatory variables, and
real gross domestic product as dependent variable. Finally, they compare their results with the
percent of aid relative to Government expenditure in the countries of study, arguing that aid
adds to the size of the capital stock of a given country. However, they find no real evidence of
aid promoting efficiency and growth.
However, plenty of studies find evidence supporting the fact that foreign aid does con-
tribute to economic development. Arndt et al. (2010) argue that “aid remains a key tool for
enhancing the developmet prospects of poor countries” (p. 1) after assessing the impact of
foreign aid in the context of program evaluation. They specify a model that contains a set of
regional fixed effects, geographic conditions and indicators of initial human capital, eliminating
covariates that represent channels through which aid may affect growth. They further develop
an instrumentation strategy for aid per capita based on whether each country is or was ever a
colony, on the population size, on whether the donor and recipient countries share a common
language and on donor-fixed effects. Their results show that aid has a positive average treat-
ment effect on growth. These results are robust to additional available data and to an extended
evaluation on additional outcomes, incorporating proximate sources of growth, indicators of so-
cial well being, and measures of economic transformation (Arndt et al., 2015), confirming that
during the past forty years, aid has “stimulated growth, promoted structural change, improved
social indicators and reduced poverty” (Arndt et al., 2015, p. 6).
Bru¨ckner (2011) studies the effect of foreign aid on GDP per capita growth for 47 least
developed countries, taking into account the reverse causality between these two variables. The
author uses a two-step procedure; in the first step, the author estimates the response of foreign
aid to economic growth using rainfall and commodity price shocks as instrumental variables,
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and in the second step the author uses the residual variation in foreign aid not driven by GDP
per capita growth as an instrument to estimate the effect of foreign aid on GDP per capita
growth. Bru¨ckner (2011)’s main findings show that “increases in real per capita GDP growth
of aid-recipient countries are associated with a statistically significant and quantitatively large
reduction in foreign aid”. Specifically, when the real GDP per capita growth rate increases in
one percent, foreign aid decreases in more than 4 percent. When this negative, significant effect
is controlled for in the growth regression, a one percent increaise in foreign aid is associated
with a 0.1 percent increase in real GDP per capita growth rate.
Clemens et al. (2011) reanalyze three published aid-growth studies, conserving the orig-
inal model specifications. However, they make straightforward changes to the models: they
allow aid to affect growth with a time lag, they eliminate omitted variable bias through first dif-
ferences and only take into account portions of aid that might produce growth within a few
years. The authors’ main results reveal that all three studies lead to the same conclusions
when making the model corrections addressed above. Specifically, they find that aid inflows
are associated with small positive economic growth and investment increases across countries.
However, “the magnitude of this relationship is modest, varies greatly across recipients and
diminishes at high levels of aid” (Clemens et al., 2011, p. 1).
Burnside & Dollar (2000) study if the effect of aid on economic growth is conditional on
economic policies, and if donors allocate more aid to recipient countries with certain economic
policies. To answer these questions, the authors estimate a two-staged least squares model,
instrumenting for aid on an economic growth regression. Specifically, they regress real GDP
per capita growth on the logarithm of initial real GDP per capita, aid receipts relative to GDP,
policies that affect growth, and other exogenous variables that affect growth. The authors allow
an interaction term between aid and policies, to capture the extent to which policies determine
how productively aid gifts are used. Burnside & Dollar (2000) find that aid has a positive
impact on economic growth in countries with good policy environments, and that this effect has
a stronger impact on growth than policies themselves.
However, Burnside & Dollar (2000)’s findings have been widely debunked by various
authors. For example, Easterly et al. (2004) attempt to replicate Burnside & Dollar (2000)’s
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results including additional available data both for the original sample period studied, and for
an updated set of years. Using the exact model specifications from Burnside & Dollar (2000),
the authors use a sample covering the years between 1970 and 1997, and divide the data into
four-year periods. They control for the same original variables, including percentage of aid
over GDP, policy index constructed by a weighted average of inflation, trade openness and
percentage of budget deficits over GDP, and an interaction term between aid and the policy
index. The authors find that, for the updated dataset including more observations for the original
time period, and new available data for the latest years, there is no evidence supporting the claim
that aid’s effectiveness on economic growth is conditional on good policies. Easterly (2003)
supports the previous conclusion after testing the relationship between aid, policies and growth
for alternative measures of these three concepts. These results rejecting Burnside & Dollar
(2000)’s conclusions have also been supported by Murphy & Tresp (2006) and Ram (2004).
Although the evidence regarding the relationship between foreign aid and politics has been
questioned, theoretical explanations suggest that development assistance has important impli-
cations over recipient countries’ institutions and governance. According to Deaton (2015), in-
flows of aid undermine institutions that foster long-run growth, as they weaken constraints and
remove the need to raise money, causing political institutions to become toxic and ineffective,
with unaccountable Governments that deny their citizens the protections of the law. Further-
more, he argues that aid undermines democracy and civic participation. Likewise, Moss et al.
(2006) conclude that states that raise a larger proportion of their revenues in the form of for-
eign aid have less incentives to invest and establish effective public institutions, since they are
less accountable to their citizens and have less urge to maintain popular legitimacy. However,
Dietrich & Winters (2015) find no empirical evidence of the previous claims.
Likewise, Wright (2009) studies the effect of foreign aid receipts conditional on progress
to democracy. Using a time-series, cross-section multinomial logit model, he finds that promises
of higher aid conditional on progress towards democratization “only provides an incentive... for
political leaders who expect to remain in office after democratization occurs” (Wright, 2009,
p. 552). However, Johnson et al. (2014) and Knack (2004) find no quantitative evidence that aid
conditionality fosters democratic reform.
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Jones & Tarp (2016) estimate a long-run cross-section and alternative dynamic panel data
models, and find a small positive net effect of total aid on political institutions, driven primarily
by stable inflows of governance aid. On the other hand, Asongu (2013) analyzes a sample of
53 african countries for a 14-year period and finds that development assistance threatens insti-
tutional quality, measured through various institutional quality dynamics. Additionally, Tavares
(2003) estimates a two-stage least squares model with instrumental variables and determines
that aid decreases corruption, possibly because aid is associated with conditions that limit the
leaders’ discretion in recipient countries, and alleviates public revenue shortages.
Clearly, there is no general agreement regarding the effectiveness on foreign aid to pro-
mote economic and political development. According to Wright (2009), a potential explana-
tion for the contradictory findings regarding the effectiveness of foreign aid, is that researchers
model the processes in fundamentally different ways. He argues that findings that aid has a
negative effect respond to cross-section models that average foreign aid values across the years
covered by each cross section. Conversely, findings that aid has a positive effect on develop-
ment respond to model specifications that pool data across countries and over time. Therefore,
this paper aims to build on the previous literature by using and alternate approach, which dis-
tinguishes between countries and time periods, using a dynamic specification with panel data
on 214 countries during a 20-year period.
3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
3.1 Variables
Dependent variable
Among the various indicators that attempt to capture Government features associated to
development, Kaufmann et al. (1999) generated the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI),
constructing “six aggregate indicators corresponding to six fundamental governance concepts”.
Within these, the Government Effectiveness Indicator captures the capacity of the state to im-
plement sound policies. Specifically, the Government Effectiveness Indicator measures “per-
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ceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation,
and the credibility of the Government’s commitment to such policies” (Kaufmann et al., 2010).
Data on the Government Effectiveness Indicator is available for 214 countries for the period
between 1996 and 2016. This indicator ranges between −2.5 and 2.5, with a higher value
indicating a more effective Government.
The WGI Government Effectiveness Index encompasses several dimensions including
quality and size of bureaucracy, quality and coverage of public infrastructure, quality and cov-
erage of several public services such as primary education, transportation and health systems,
infrastructure disruption, state failure, policy instability, quality of public administration, quality
of financial management, citizens’ level of trust in the Government, allocation and management
of public resources, among others. According to Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013), the data used
to obtain information on all these dimensions is based on surveys to reflect the perceptions of
a very diverse group of respondents, including analysts, firms, households and agencies with
extensive knowledge on the governance situation in their local countries.
However, there are several potential limitations on using the WGI Government Effective-
ness Indicator as a measure of Government effectiveness. Arndt & Oman (2008) argue that
the Government Effectiveness Indicator, like all the other WGIs, lacks transparency due to its
high complexity, as the composition and weights of primary sources to construct the index vary
across countries and over time. Furthermore, they consider that the WGIs lack reproducibil-
ity as many of the underlying indicators are not available to the public, and that they are not
backed by an underlying theory of governance to explain the meaning of the indicators. Arndt
& Oman (2008) further argue that these problems generate a bias that remains hidden from
users. This causes the WGIs to lack comparability over time, and to give limited guidance on
how to improve the quality of governance. Nonetheless, Kaufmann et al. (2008) debunked the
previous claims, arguing that “the WGI are sufficiently informative that many cross-country
comparisons result in statistically (and likely also practically) significant differences in esti-
mated governance”.
Moreover, Lee & Whitford (2009) recognize that the intrinsic subjectivity that character-
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izes the Government Effectiveness Indicator may become a potential limitation, as informants’
recalls may be biased. However, they argue that it is often difficult to find objective measures
that completely approximate all the dimensions of organizational performance. Therefore, they
recommend using a subjective measure of the Government’s performance, such as the WGIs’
Government Effectiveness Indicator for three main reasons. First, Government effectiveness
is socially constructed by multiple stakeholders from the public and private sector, making it
impossible to assess this concept without taking into account subjective perceptions of these
actors. Second, according to Lee & Whitford (2009), subjective measures of organizational
performance, such as the WGI Government Effectiveness Indicator, generally have a positive
correlation with objective measures of organizational performance. Third, subjective mecha-
nisms to measure Government effectiveness at a country level are at least as good as objective
ones, if they were available (Lee & Whitford, 2009).
Figure 2 presents the evolution of the world average level of Government effectiveness for
the original sample of 214 countries, between 1996 and 2016. The values for the Government
Effectiveness Indicator have been normalized between zero and one to facilitate interpretation
and analysis. The world average level of Government effectiveness has remained around 0.5 for
the study period. However, differences emerge when analyzing the level of Government effec-
tiveness by region, as shown in figure 3. Specifically, for regions associated with higher income
levels such as North America and Europe and Central Asia, the average levels of Government
effectiveness are higher and exhibit less volatility than for regions associated with lower income
levels, such as Middle East and North Africa, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Independent Variable of Interest
To measure inflows of foreign aid, I use the logarithm of Net Official Development Assis-
tance taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Net Official Development
Assistance refers to aid flows donated by members of the OECD’s Development Assistance
Committee (DAC), multilateral institutions and non-DAC countries, designed specifically for
development purposes. It includes grants, soft loans made on concessional terms with a grant
element of at least 25% and technical assistance, and excludes loans and credits for military
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Figure 2: World average Government effectiveness, 1996 - 2016
Source: World Bank World Governance Indicators.
Figure 3: Average Government effectiveness by region, 1996 - 2016
Source: World Bank World Governance Indicators.
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purposes, anti-terrorism practices or acts of peacekeeping. Before 2005, the OECD’s DAC
additionally provided Official Aid to more advanced countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
countries of the former Soviet Union, and additional advanced developing countries. The OECD
eliminated these Official Aid transfers in 2005, but data values for net ODA before 2005 in the
World Development Indicators database (World Bank, 2016) also consider Official Aid inflows.
The data on Net ODA and Official Aid is available for 264 countries for 1960-2015. Fol-
lowing Chao (2015), Net ODA is used above other measures of foreign aid to avoid confounding
the effect of development aid with that of private donations or investments, which differ greatly
with foreign aid in terms of motives and disbursement. Furthermore, net ODA leaves aside mil-
itary and anti-terrorism assistance, which are not related to economic development and welfare
programs.
Figure 4 shows the increase in world average official development assistance and aid dur-
ing the last 20 years. The amount of aid donated to least developed countries has increased
by around $400 millions from 1995 to 2015. Moreover, as shown in figure 5, most of this in-
crease in foreign aid has been disbursed to South Asian, and Middle Eastern and North African
countries.
Figure 6 plots the relationship between Government effectiveness and net official devel-
opment assistance and aid for the original sample. Although there is no obvious correlation
between the amount of foreign aid received and the effectiveness of the Government, the plot
shows that higher levels of foreign aid are associated with lower levels of Government effec-
tiveness.
Control variables
Following the literature on the Government effectiveness, this study incorporates a set
of five economic and political control variables to estimate the effect of foreign aid over gov-
ernment effectiveness. First, according to Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013) and Lee & Whitford
(2009), the level of a country’s Government effectiveness depends on its income level. Specif-
ically, richer countries have more effective Governments. Therefore, Gross Domestic Product
per capita is included as a control variable, with an expected positive and significant effect on
the level of Government effectiveness.
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Figure 4: World Average Official Development Assistance, 1995 - 2015
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
Figure 5: Average Official Development Assistance by region, 1995 - 2015
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
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Figure 6: Net Official Development Assistance and Aid vs. Government Effectiveness
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
Second, Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013) further argue that larger countries have larger bud-
gets and more qualified human capital, influencing the complexity of public management.
Therefore, a country’s institutional characteristics may be captured by its population density.
Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013)’s results show that a country’s population density has a positive,
significant impact over the effectiveness of its Government. Given that population density –
measured by the population per squared kilometer of land area– is a significant determinant of
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the level of Government effectiveness, it is included as a control variable.
Third, Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013) find that the level of social diversity, related to the
degree of variation in the population’s age, gender, and nationality, positively influences the
effectiveness of the Government since it provides a better understanding of organizational de-
mand. Social diversity may be captured by the degree of participation of women in politics. For
this reason, I incorporate the proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments.
Fourth, Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013) establish a positive relationship between the level of
political constraints to the different independent branches of Government, and its level of effec-
tiveness. In theory, politicians play a major role in the evolution of public administrations, and
thus, their power in defining and changing policies is a crucial determinant of the effectiveness
of the public body. Therefore, the Political Constraint Index is included as a control variable.
The possible scores for this index range from zero to one, with lower values indicating less
constraints.
Last, Montes & Paschoal (2015) find a significant relationship between a country’s level
of corruption and the effectiveness of its Government. Specifically, they argue that countries
that are perceived as less corrupt are also perceived to be more effective. Therefore, the level
of control of corruption, measured by the WGI, is incorporated as a control variable. The WGI
control of corruption indicator ranges from −2.5 (weak control of corruption) to 2.5 (strong
control of corruption) but has been normalized between zero and one to facilitate interpretation
and analysis.
Table 1 summarizes the sources and definitions of each of the variables included to esti-
mate the effect of foreign aid over government effectiveness and Figure 7 plots the relationships
between Government effectiveness and the different control variables. The plots evidence a
strong positive correlation between control of corruption and Government effectiveness. More-
over, GDP per capita appears to have decreasing returns over Government Effectiveness. The
plots do not reveal any other clear correlation between the remaining control variables and Gov-
ernment effectiveness.
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Table 1: Definitions and Sources of Variables
Variable Definition Source
Dependent Variable
Government
Effectiveness
Perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures,
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the
credibility of the Government’s commitment to such policies.
World Governance Indicators
(World Bank, 2016)
Independent Variable
Net Official
Development Assistance
and Official Aid
Government aid designed to promote the economic development
and welfare of developing countries. It includes grants, soft loans
with a grant element of at least 25% and technical assistance. It
excludes military, anti-terrorism or peacekeeping assistance.
World Development Indicators
(World Bank, 2016)
Control Variables
Gross Domestic
Product per capita
GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP),
converted to constant 2011 international dollars.
International Comparison Program
Database (World Bank, 2016)
Population Density People per square kilometer of land area.
World Development Indicators
(World Bank, 2016)
Women Political
Participation Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments. The World Bank Databank
POLCON
Political constraint index which captures the feasibility of
policy change (the extent to which a change in the preferences of
any one actor may lead to a change in Government policy). The
index first identifies the number of independent branches of
Government, then takes into account the extent of alignment across
branches of Government and finally captures the extent of preference
heterogeneity within each legislative branch.
The Political Constraint Index
Database
Control of Corruption
Perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption,
as well as ”capture” of the state by elites and private interests.
World Governance Indicators
(World Bank, 2016)
Figure 7: Relationship between Government effectiveness and control variables
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3.2 Descriptive statistics
Table 2 displays summary statistics of each of the variables described above, for the complete
sample of 214 countries. With the purpose of reducing missing values, values for all variables
corresponding to country i are averaged over three-year periods. Therefore, the final sample
includes data on seven periods for each country. Given that incorporating the POLCON variable
in the final results limits the sample to 137 countries, table 3 presents the summary statistics for
the restricted sample.
Table 2: Summary statistics (complete sample)
Variable Obs. Mean Standard Dev. Min. Max.
Government Effectiveness 1,417 0.4923 0.2137 0.0000 1.0000
Net ODA (Millions of US$) 1,113 458,88 795.43 -644.96 11,865.69
GDP per capita (thousands of 2011 international $) 1,327 16.13 19.49 0.34 126.60
Population Density (per square km.) 1,425 384.19 1,871.83 0.14 20,940.33
Proportion of Women in Parliament 1,277 15.12 10.56 0.00 63.80
Control of Corruption 1,424 0.4229 0.2356 0.0000 1.0000
Political Constraint Index 1,147 0.418 0.309 0.000 0.890
Table 3: Summary statistics (restricted sample)
Variable Obs. Mean Standard Dev. Min. Max.
Government Effectiveness 1,147 0.4838 0.2160 0.0000 1.0000
Net ODA (Millions of US$) 908 522.05 849.99 -644.96 11,865.69
GDP per capita (thousands of 2011 international $) 1,104 16.32 19.33 0.34 126.60
Population Density (per square km.) 1,137 171.51 570.57 1.49 7,719.4
Proportion of Women in Parliament 1,084 15.96 10.46 0.00 63.80
Control of Corruption 1,147 0.4039 0.2425 0.0000 1.0000
Political Constraint Index 1,147 0.418 0.309 0.000 0.890
Tables 2 and 3 show that including the political constraint variable biases the sample
towards slightly richer countries, with the average GDP per capita increasing by approximately
$200. However, the restricted sample has an average Government effectiveness 0.0085 lower
than the complete sample, and its average inflows of ODA are, on average, $ 63.17 millions
higher than on the complete sample.
Table 4 shows summary statistics for all variables, by region. On average, more developed
regions, such as North America and Europe and Central Asia, have higher levels of Govern-
ment effectiveness, while least developed regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and
the Middle East and North Africa have less effective Governments. It is precisely the latter
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Table 4: Mean values for all variables, by region (restricted sample)
Region
Government
Effectiveness
(normalized)
Net ODA
(US$ Millions)
GDPpc
(US$ Thousands)
Pop. Density
(Per sq. km) Women
C.Corruption
(normalized) POLCONv
East Asia &
Pacific
0.5269
(0.2357)
499.55
(771.29)
19.61
(22.33)
511.04
(1,522.52)
15.12
(8.57)
0.4287
(0.2732)
0.3892
(0.3259)
Europe &
Central Asia
0.6240
(0.2220)
343.35
(428.59)
24.59
(17.44)
102.39
(88.46)
19.88
(10.67)
0.5378
(0.2797)
0.6120
(0.2722)
Latin America &
Caribbean
0.4620
(0.1328)
233.64
(289.49)
10.77
(6.05)
94.01
(102.49)
17.82
(9.67)
0.3848
(0.1756)
0.4549
(0.2193)
Middle East &
North Africa
0.4688
(0.1656)
604.53
(1,398.76)
30.21
(30.82)
209.32
(376.59)
7.87
(7.76)
0.3851
(0.1741)
0.2432
(0.3058)
North America
0.8619
(0.0331) 0.00
43.27
(5.77)
17.90
(14.94)
18.60
(4.12)
0.8393
(0.0658)
0.8550
(0.0052)
South Asia
0.4062
(0.1406)
1,202.33
(1,382.20)
4.32
(3.13)
412.52
(415.48)
11.61
(8.66)
0.2962
(0.1637)
0.2811
(.2741)
Sub-Saharan
Africa
0.3217
(0.1342)
645.21
(759.05)
3.58
(5.02)
83.25
(118.28)
14.86
(10.53)
0.2617
(0.1408)
0.2759
(0.2533)
regions that exhibit the highest average receipts of official development assistance, reaching an
average of US$1,202 millions in South Asia and US$645 millions in Sub-Saharan Africa. Fur-
thermore, the regions with the highest levels of control of corruption and political constraints
are the same ones with the highest values for the Government effectiveness indicator, while the
regions with least control of corruption and smallest political constraints correspond to those
with lowest Government effectiveness. South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and Middle East and
North Africa are also the regions with lowest average gender diversity and income levels. This
relationships may arise precisely because aid is aimed at countries and regions with lowest State
capacity, which is inversely correlated with the need for resources. Therefore, aid allocation is
not random, but it targets countries with weaker states and highest needs.
4 Identification Strategy and Methodology
To analyze the effect of foreign aid on Government effectiveness, I estimate a dynamic panel
data model based on a sample of 137 countries during the period between 1995 and 2015.
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Specifically, the model is specified as:
GEit = β0+β1GEi,t−1+β2log(AIDit)+ γ ′Xit +µit , (1)
where i indexes countries and t indexes time. GEit is the measure of the Government effec-
tiveness indicator, normalized from 0 to 1; AID is the amount of foreign official development
assistance inflows in millions; Xit is a vector of control variables including Gross Domestic
Product per capita, population density, proportion of seats held by women in parliaments, the
control of corruption indicator and political constraints indicator; γ is a vector of coefficients
associated to the control variables; and µit is the residual error.
There are several potential econometric issues that may arise when estimating equation
(1). First, the net inflows of Official Development Assistance are endogenous since causality
between Government effectiveness and foreign aid may run in both directions. On one hand, the
level of foreign aid received by country i during period t may impact the level of effectiveness of
the Government at that given period. However, the level of Government effectiveness of country
i may also determine the amount of foreign aid received during the period t, considering that
various assistance programs disburse aid conditional on certain progress towards democracy
and political stability. Therefore, in this model specification, foreign aid may be correlated to
the error term µit .
Second, the literature suggests that the complexity of political systems and institutions
makes it hard for changes in these variables in one period to occur independently from those in
another period. On the contrary, Government effectiveness is likely to be predetermined by its
one-period lagged value. The dynamic nature of this model gives rise to the issue of first-order
serial correlation, in which successive residuals are correlated with each other.
Third, country-specific characteristics that are time persistent and invariant may be cor-
related with the explanatory variables incorporated in equation (1). These unobservable fixed
effects are contained in the error term.
Finally, equation (1) may also be subject to measurement error, since the WGI Govern-
ment effectiveness indicator is based on subjective measures of effectiveness, with sources that
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vary in quality and number across countries.
Given the nature of the data used to estimate equation (1), there is a small number of time
periods (7) in comparison to the number of countries included in the sample (214).
The standard methods for panel data estimation are fixed effects and random effects mod-
els. The fixed effects model uses the within transformation to incorporate variations within
countries, but is incapable of estimating parameters associated with time-invariant regressors.
Furthermore, estimation becomes more challenging as N → ∞, since there are further individ-
ual specific effects to estimate. The random effects model provides a more efficient alternative,
as it attains identification from variations across countries and time periods. However, a ran-
dom effects approach is only appropriate if country-specific unobservable characteristics are
not correlated with the other explanatory variables. There is reason to believe that the relation-
ship between foreign aid and Government effectiveness may be determined by country-specific
factors, which would make a random effects model inappropriate. In addition, these standard
estimators are inconsistent under dynamic specifications, since the presence of the lagged de-
pendent variable as in equation (1) violates the strict exogeneity assumption.
To deal with the aforementioned econometric issues, Arellano & Bond (1991) developed
a difference Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, which “exploits all the linear
moment restrictions that follow from the assumption of no serial correlation in the errors, in
an equation which contains individual effects, lagged dependent variables and no strictly ex-
ogenous variables” (p. 277). This method uses first differences to deal with the heterogeneity
problem caused by the existence of fixed effects, and to deal with endogeneity it instruments
for the differenced independent variables using lagged values of the independent variables in
levels. This method provides consistent estimators even in the presence of measurement er-
rors and eliminates the bias caused by endogenous regressors assuming that all instruments are
predetermined.
According to Hauk & Wacziarg (2009), however, the Arellano & Bond (1991) estimator
requires the loss of at least two periods of data to be able to implement the instrumental vari-
ables’ procedure. This could generate a bias in the estimators when the number of periods is
small, as in the case of this study. Moreover, this estimator suffers from the problem of weak
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instruments, which biases the parameters towards fixed-effects estimators (Hauk & Wacziarg,
2009).
In light of the previous GMM estimator, Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond
(1998) developed a “System GMM” estimator, which uses lagged differences to instrument for
variables in levels in addition to using lagged levels to instrument for variables in differences.
These two equations (i.e. in levels and in differences) generate a system of equations which ex-
ploit additional moment conditions. According to Hauk & Wacziarg (2009), the system GMM
estimator adresses the weak instruments issue in the Arellano & Bond (1991) estimator and
eliminates measurement error bias. However, the system gmm estimator is consistent only if
the additional moment conditions imposed when instrumenting for the levels equation are valid.
This gives rise to the problem of instrument proliferation. Since the estimator uses all available
lagged values of the regressors as instruments, the number of instruments increases as the num-
ber of periods increases. The problem of instrument proliferation may cause the Sargan-Hansen
test of overidentifying restrictions to lose validity and deliver unrealistic results.
For these reasons, to estimate equation (1) I implement a system-gmm estimator, follow-
ing a parsimonious approach in which I only use the variable of interest (i.e. the logarithm of net
ODA) as a gmm-style instrumental variable. Since all the other right-side variables are consid-
ered to be endogenous, I treat them as standard instruments, with one column in the instrument
matrix per variable. This is further discussed in section 5.
5 Empirical Results
This section presents and discusses the main results of the paper. In the first subsection, I
analyze the estimated effect of net foreign aid inflows on Government effectiveness, which holds
for different model specifications and is consistent with the expected result based on previous
literature findings. Specifically, the results show that foreign aid has a significant negative
effect on a country’s level of Government effectiveness. The following subsection presents a
preliminary analysis on the reverse causality between Government effectiveness and foreign
aid. The findings suggest that when controlling for the one-period lagged value of foreign
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aid, a country’s level of Government effectiveness has no significant effect on the level of net
official development inflows received. This sheds light on possible future research regarding
the effectiveness of aid conditionality programs.
5.1 Estimated effect of foreign aid on Government effectiveness
Table 5 presents the results of the set of regressions for 3-year periods, using Government
effectiveness as the dependent variable and all available observations for each case. Columns
(1) and (2) represent fixed and random effects estimates, column (3) reports Arellano-Bond two-
step difference GMM estimates with the Windmeijer (2005) correction, and column (4) reports
System GMM estimates with the full set of instruments, using the logarithm of net ODA as
the only gmm-style variable and all available lags as instruments. There is substantial variation
regarding the magnitude of coefficients from one model to another, but the negative effect of
foreign aid on Government effectiveness holds for all four estimation methods.
Although fixed and random effects estimates are not consistent under dynamic panel data
specifications, they are presented for comparative purposes. Hausman (1978) developed a
model specification test to determine whether “unobserved individual factors are present which
are not orthogonal to the included right-hand-side variable” (p. 1251). The Hausman Test com-
paring fixed and random effects models in columns (1) and (2) of table 5 delivers a test statistic
of χ2(7) = 351.78 and a corresponding p− value of 0.0000, which leads to the rejection of the
null hypothesis that the systematic differences between both models are not significant. There-
fore, the test suggests that a fixed-effects model is more appropriate, justifying the choice of
estimation technique for equation (1). The fixed-effects model shows a negative insignificant
effect of foreign aid on Government effectiveness.
Regarding columns (3) and (4), the Arellano-Bond test proves the presence of serial cor-
relation in the second order of first-differenced idiosyncratic errors. If the test statistic fails to
reject the null hypothesis, then there is evidence that the moment conditions used to estimate
both models (3) and (4) are valid. On the contrary, rejecting the null hypothesis confirms the
presence of second order serial correlation, implying that moment conditions are invalid. The
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Table 5: Regression results
Dependent Variable: Government Effectiveness
Explanatory
Variables
Fixed Effects
(1)
Random Effects
(2)
AB (W)
(3)
System GMM
(4)
GEi,t−1
0.4036***
(0.0363)
0.7671***
(0.0252)
0.0426
(0.0514)
0.7167***
(0.0293)
NetODAit
-0.0002
(0.0005)
-0.0005
(0.0010)
-0.0008*
(0.0004)
-0.0031***
(0.0007)
GDPpcit
0.0033***
(0.0007)
0.0004**
(0.0002)
0.0032***
(0.0008)
0.0005**
(0.0002)
Pop. Densityit
-0.0001***
(0.0001)
0.000002
(0.000002)
-0.0002***
(0.0001)
0.000004
(0.000003)
Womenit
-0.0001
(0.0003)
0.0002*
(0.0001)
-0.0001
(0.0003)
0.0002**
(0.0001)
C. Corruptionit
0.2854***
(0.0330)
0.1711***
(0.0200)
0.2922***
(0.0512)
0.2007***
(0.0226)
POLCONvit
0.0010
(0.0088)
0.0164**
(0.0069)
0.0061
(0.0088)
0.0199***
(0.0069)
Countries 137 137 136 137
Observations 715 715 575 715
Instruments 23 33
Arellano Bond
test (p-value) 0.0130 0.0500
Hansen test
(p-value) 0.0070 0.0010
Difference-in-Hansen
test (p-value) 0.644
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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results in table 5 show that there is evidence to reject the null hypothesis of no serial correlation,
although the system GMM estimation in column (4) does so at a 5% confidence level. This may
be a result of including strongly predetermined variables in the model specification (which will
be subsequently discussed).
Furthermore, given that both Arellano-Bond difference GMM and System GMM use
lagged values of independent variables (in differences or/and in levels) as instruments, the num-
ber of instrumental variables exceeds the number of parameters to estimate, which causes both
models to be overidentified. The Hansen test proves whether these identifying restrictions are
valid. Failing to reject the null hypothesis of joint validity in the Hansen test implies that the
moment conditions used to compute parameters on models (3) and (4) are invalid, and thus, the
models may be misspecified. According to the results displayed in table 5, the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected, suggesting that the moment conditions in models (3) and (4) are invalid.
The previous problem might be the result of incorporating strongly predetermined vari-
ables, which would mean that the lagged values used as instruments are not exogenous. To
test whether including a specific variable into the System GMM estimation renders the moment
conditions invalid, table 6 shows the effect of incorporating additional variables to the system
gmm estimation. Columns (1) through (6) report System GMM estimations using the nor-
malized Government effectiveness indicator as dependent variable, the logarithm of net ODA
as the only GMM-style variable, additional controls as standard instrumental variables and all
available lags as instruments.
The results displayed in table 6 show that there is no sign of second order serial correla-
tion in first-differenced idiosyncratic errors in models (1) through (5), as the p− values in the
Arellano-Bond test fail to reject the null hypothesis. The problem of second order serial auto-
correlation in first-differenced idiosyncratic errors arises when the POLCON variable is added
to control for political constraints in equation (1), as shown in column (6). The POLCONv vari-
able is strongly predetermined by its three-period lagged values, which causes the differenced
errors in equation (1) to be serially correlated at orders higher than one. Furthermore, including
this variable rejects the null hypothesis of valid overidentifying restrictions, whereas in model
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Table 6: System GMM regression results
Dependent variable: Government Effectiveness
System GMM
Explanatory
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GEi,t−1
0.9194***
(0.0160)
0.8821***
(0.0224)
0.8780***
(0.2229)
0.8732***
(0.0240)
0.6535***
(0.0472)
0.7167***
(0.0293)
NetODAit
-0.0026***
(0.0009)
-0.0020***
(0.0006)
-0.0020***
(0.0006)
-0.0024***
(0.0007)
-0.0029***
(0.0008)
-0.0031***
(0.0007)
GDPpcit
0.0008***
(0.0104)
0.0007***
(0.0002)
0.0010***
(0.0003)
0.0007***
(0.0003)
0.0005**
(0.0002)
Pop.Densityit
0.000004***
(0.000002)
0.000006*
(0.000004)
0.000003
(0.000004)
0.000004
(0.000003)
Womenit
0.0003**
(0.0002)
0.0004**
(0.0002)
0.0002**
(0.0001)
C.Corruptionit
0.2534***
(0.0354)
0.2007***
(0.0226)
POLCONvit
0.0199***
(0.0069)
Constant
0.0505***
(0.0097)
0.0546***
(0.0104)
0.0564***
(0.0105)
0.0541***
(0.0107)
0.0658***
(0.0114)
0.0591***
(0.0091)
Instruments 28 29 30 31 32 33
Countries 172 167 166 160 160 137
Observations 916 885 884 838 838 715
Arellano-Bond
test (p-value) 0.2390 0.3610 0.3610 0.7070 0.6360 0.0500
Hansen test
(p-value) 0.037 0.0930 0.0780 0.0670 0.1200 0.0010
Difference-in-Hansen
(p-value) 0.2360 0.3460 0.2870 0.1210 0.1680 0.6440
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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(5), when including all other controls, all overidentifying restrictions are valid.4
Despite the problems regarding the specification of model (6), I have decided to stick to
the results displayed in the System GMM estimation with the complete set of control variables,
including the POLCON index, since this variable is significant at a 1% confidence level to
explain the variation in a country’s Government effectiveness. Although it is known that there
are issues arising with the specification of the System GMM presented in column (6), estimates
presented in column (5) are certainly biased due to the omission of the POLCONv variable.
Specifically, the correct model specification is believed to be:
GEit = β1GEi,t−1+β2log(AIDit)+β3GDPpcit +β4PopDensityit
+β5Womenit +β6CCorruptionit +β7POLCONv+µit , (2)
while the model presented in column (5) estimates the equation:
GEit = β1GEi,t−1+β2log(AIDit)+β3GDPpcit +β4PopDensityit
+β5Womenit +β6CCorruptionit + vit (3)
Therefore, the estimates in equation (3) not only reflect the idiosyncratic error, but also the
potential effect of the POLCON variable, as
vit = β7POLCONv+µit (4)
The expected value of coefficients β1 through β6 in model (5) is therefore given by:
E[β̂k] = βk +
β7cov(x,POLCONv)
var(xk)
, (5)
where xk are the different explanatory variables in equation (3) and k ∈ [1, ...6] index the coeffi-
4The p-values associated with the Hansen-test statistics in the models from table 6 are not affected by instrument
proliferation, since to avoid such problem, I have opted to follow a more parsimonious empirical approach, in which
only the variable of interest (i.e. Net ODA) is instrumented as a GMM style variable. Nonetheless, since all other
variables are believed to be endogenous, I treat them as standard IVs.
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Table 7: Covariance matrix
GEi,t−1 NetODAit GDPpcit PopDensityit Womenit CCorruptionit POLCONvit
GEi,t−1 0.2160
NetODAit -0.0211 0.8268
GDPpcit 0.8530 -1.8665 137.8850
PopDensityit 17.2151 -9.1128 1,242.5800 185,158
Womenit 0.0488 0.6781 -16.0620 -172.4300 92.0553
CCorruptionit 0.0207 -0.0240 0.9207 18.0526 0.0489 0.0263
POLCONvit 0.0158 0.0043 0.1496 -4.1963 0.1972 0.0152 0.0736
cients corresponding to each explanatory variable. If the the omitted variable bias in model (5)
follows the expected direction given by equation (5), then the coefficients in model (6) should
be less biased than the ones estimated in model (5).
Table 7 presents the covariance matrix between all variables in equation (2) and table 8
compares the expected direction of the omitted variable bias in the coefficients of equation (3)5
with the actual direction of the bias in the coefficients of the model displayed in column (5)
of Table 6. From table 8, omitting the variable POLCON biases the coefficients in the Sys-
tem GMM estimation presented in column (5) of table 6 in the expected direction, except for
the coefficient associated with the one-period lag of Government effectiveness. This suggests
that 1) the model specified in column (6) of table 6 may have another source of misspecifica-
tion, affecting the coefficient associated with GEi,t−1, and that 2) the coefficients in column (6)
associated with all other remaining variables, including NetODAit , are less biased than those
estimated in column (5).
Given that this study aims to measure the effect of foreign aid on Government effective-
ness, I focus on the fact that this variable’s coefficient is biased in the expected direction. Fur-
thermore, Table 6 shows that the magnitude of the coefficient associated to Net ODA does not
vary much from one System GMM estimation to another, and remains negative and significant
after the inclusion of the different control variables.
The System GMM estimation reported in column (6) from table 6 suggests a negative
significant effect of net foreign aid inflows on the level of effectiveness of a country’s Govern-
ment. Specifically, a one percent increase in the net ODA inflows in country i during period t
5The expected direction of omitted variable bias is calculated from the second term in equation (5), using data
on variances and covariances presented in Table 7 and a positive expected value for β7, based on the estimation
presented in column (6) from Table 6
48
Table 8: Expected and actual omitted variable bias
Expected bias
direction
Actual bias
direction
GEi,t−1 Positive Negative
NetODAit Positive Positive
GDPpcit Positive Positive
PopDensityit Negative Negative
Womenit Positive Positive
CCorruptionit Positive Positive
decreases its (normalized) Government effectiveness indicator by 0.000031 points. This effect
is statistically significant at a 1% confidence level. This finding is consistent with Deaton (2015)
and Moss et al. (2006) in that higher aid inflows provide less incentives to invest and establish
an effective public institutions, render Governments incapable of developing internal sources of
funds and a strong fiscal capacity, and reduce levels of public accountability, all of which are
measures of Government effectiveness. Furthermore, considering higher levels of democracy
imply higher levels of Government effectiveness, this finding seems to be consistent with John-
son et al. (2014) and Knack (2004), since higher levels of aid are not promoting Government
effectiveness. This result may provide an incentive to question the effectiveness of aid programs
that disburse development assistance conditional on certain progress towards democratization
or institutional stability, as the aid disbursements by the Millenium Challenge Corporation.
Results also suggest that there is a linear relationship between foreign aid and Government
effectiveness, since including a quadratic term of net oda inflows is insignificant and reduces
the power of the post-estimation tests reported in tables 5 and 6. This suggests that increasing
net ODA inflows has no diminishing returns over Government effectiveness.
In addition, income level, control of corruption and political constraints are significant
determinants of a country’s Government effectiveness at a 1% confidence level, and gender di-
versity is a significant determinant of a country’s Government effectiveness at a 5% confidence
level. Specifically, a one thousand dollar increase in country i’s GDP per capita during period
t increases Government effectiveness by 0.0005 points. This finding supports Lee & Whitford
(2009)’s conclusions that wealthier countries have higher perceptions of Government effective-
ness. This may respond to the fact that wealthier countries have more available resources to
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grant high quality public services and infrastructure.
A one percent increase in the proportion of seats held by women in country i’s parliament
during period t increases Government effectiveness by 0.0002 points, and a 0.1 increase in
the political constraint index POLCONv of country i during period t increases Government
effectiveness by approximately 0.002 points, similar to Garcia-Sanchez et al. (2013)’s findings.
Finally, in conformity with Montes & Paschoal (2015)’s result, a 0.1 increase in the normalized
control of corruption indicator increases Government effectiveness by 0.02 points. Population
density has a small positive but insignificant effect on Government effectiveness.
5.2 Reverse causality: The effect of Government effectiveness on foreign
aid receipts
The previous section reveals that aid receipts reduce the level of Government effectiveness. This
section focuses on reverse causality between Government effectiveness and foreign aid. There
are several development assistance programs that disburse aid only to countries that meet spe-
cific criteria and conditions regarding democratization and policy implementation. Therefore,
it is reasonable to consider the existence of a reverse causality between foreign aid and Govern-
ment effectiveness, as the latter may be a determinant of the amount of development assistance
received. To measure this relationship, I estimate the equation:
log(AIDit) = β1log(AIDi,t−1)+β2GEit +µit , (6)
using the same model specifications as in section 5.1 (only the variable of interest as gmm-style
variable). Table 9 shows the results of the system GMM regression using the logarithm of net
official development assistance as dependent variable.
This System GMM estimation suggests two main results regarding the effect of Govern-
ment effectiveness on the receipts of net official development assistance. The first one is that,
contrary to what would be expected due to the growing popularity of aid conditionality pro-
grams, Government effectiveness has a negative impact on the amount of Net Official Develop-
ment Assistance received by country i during period t. Since aid is not disbursed randomly, but
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Table 9: Reverse causality regression results
Dependent variable: Log( Net ODA)
Explanatory
Variables System GMM
NetODAi,t−1
0.9614***
(0.1270)
GEit
-0.3347
(0.5467)
Constant
0.4179
(0.7123)
Countries 173
Observations 931
Instruments 28
Arellano-Bond
test (p-value) 0.8610
Hansen test
(p-value) 0.0010
Difference in Hansen
test (p-value) 0.2180
Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance:,* significant at 10%;
* significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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based on specific interests and criteria, it may seem that government effectiveness plays no role
in the allocation of foreign aid. However, this result is statistically insignificant, which suggests
that there is actually no reverse causality between these two variables.
The second main result is that the amount of development assistance received by country
i during period t is largely determined by the amount of aid received in period t−1. According
to the regression results, a one percent increase in the lagged value of Net ODA increases
current Net ODA in 0.96%. If aid actually promotes economic growth and development, as
argued by authors such as Sachs (2005), Arndt et al. (2010), Bru¨ckner (2011) and Clemens
et al. (2011), then developing countries would need less current ODA receipts in comparison
with the previous period. This would mean that development aid is actually being used to fund
development programs in the recipient country, which stimulate growth. Nonetheless, these
contradictory results are aligned with Boone (1996)’s findings that aid is not actually being
allocated to development programs but rather to the elite, and that it does not actually promote
economic development.
Although the Arellano-Bond test results suggest that moment conditions in the regression
are valid due to the absence of serial correlation in the first-differenced errors, the Hansen
test suggests that overidentifying restrictions in the model are not valid. This points to an
issue of model misspecification. Evidently, the model presented in table 9 does not control for
any variable that may be correlated with the amount of foreign development aid received by a
developing country in a given period. Therefore, the evidence presented is not conclusive and
further studies are needed to determine whether these results hold, and if there is actually no
reverse causality between the foreign aid and Government effectiveness.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyses the relationship between net foreign development aid inflows and Govern-
ment effectiveness for a general sample of 173 countries during seven 3-year periods. I use data
on Government effectiveness from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators and data on
official development assistance from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.
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I estimate a dynamic panel specification using Government effectiveness as a dependent
variable, the logarithm of net official development assistance as independent variable, and con-
trolling for income level, population density, gender diversity, control of corruption and political
constraints. I estimate a series of system GMM specifications, that solve the problem of weak
instruments present in Arellano & Bond (1991), while dealing with issues of endogeneity, het-
erogeneity and serial correlation.
Using a system GMM estimator with 33 instruments, and a sample of 137 countries with
715 observations, I find that current net official development assistance inflows have a negative,
significant effect on a country’s current level of Government effectiveness. These findings are
consistent with Deaton (2015) and Moss et al. (2006), who argue that foreign aid undermines a
Governments ability to establish effective institutions, develop strong fiscal capacity and render
account to its citizens. Furthermore, the relationship between foreign aid and Government
effectiveness is linear and exhibits no diminishing returns.
The system GMM estimation also reveals that GDP per capita, population density, gender
diversity in the legislative branch, control of corruption, and political constraints have positive,
significant effects on Government effectiveness. These findings are consistent with the previous
research and literature regarding the determinants of Government effectiveness. Therefore,
political development programs should focus on promoting improvements in these variables,
rather than disbursing development aid conditional on governance characteristic, which actually
hinders the ability of Governments to provide public services and infrastructure and develop and
implement policy reforms. Further research is needed regarding the mechanisms through which
these variables may favor Government effectiveness, as well as the intermediate mechanisms
by which foreign aid diminishes Government effectiveness.
Nonetheless, the final model specified and analyzed faces issues of serial correlation in
first differenced errors and invalid overidentifying restrictions, as a result of the inclusion of the
political constraints control variable. Although it seems that these results are a consequence
of problems with the data, it may also be a signal of model misspecification. However, failing
to include this variable would generate an omitted variable bias, with the certainty of a model
misspecification. Furthermore, the analysis of the omitted variable bias shows that omitting
53
the variable of political constraints biases coefficients in the expected direction in all but one
variable. This suggest that the system-GMM estimation with the whole set of control variables
is unbiased, even though the Arellano-Bond and Hansen tests are not powerful enough.
This paper also studies the reverse causality between Government effectiveness and for-
eign aid. As a growing number of agencies have developed programs of aid disbursement con-
ditional on good governance characteristics, the level of a country’s Government effectiveness
may be an important determinant of the amount of Official Development Assistance received.
However, contrary to what is expected, estimating a System GMM with 28 instruments, a sam-
ple of 173 countries and 931 observations, I find that current Government effectiveness has
a negative, insignificant effect over the amount of current net foreign aid inflows received by
country i. This suggests that in general, aid disbursements do not follow good governance char-
acteristics. Probably, according to Kuziemko & Werker (2006) and Alesina & Dollar (2000),
foreign aid disbursements are more responsive to political domestic and international interests.
Finally, the reverse causality results reveal that current foreign aid receipts in country i are
largely determined by the country’s past receipts of foreign aid. Specifically, the lagged value of
net official development assistance inflows in country i have a positive, significant effect on the
country’s current amount of foreign aid receipts. These results imply that Official Development
Assistance is not achieving its purpose of promoting economic growth and development. If
that would be the case, then foreign aid receipts would decrease in future periods. Future
research should focus precisely on finding the reasons why ODA is not being effective, and on
determining whether it is being allocated to its original purposes or not.
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